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I. Introduction
1 Can phenomenology and pragmatism, two early twentieth century theories, be alive
today and furnish a valid possibility in our philosophical  landscape? Moreover,  can
they work together? The operation does not seem impossible since Peirce himself held
a phenomenology, which is an indispensable part of his never-finished system; James’s
psychology is often a phenomenology, and Husserl recognized James as an interesting
author because of his phenomenological insights. However, the parochial attitude has
often undermined the possibility of a common path, notwithstanding noble attempts to
use them together (i.e. Rosenthal & Bourgeois 1983). But, there are a few obstacles.
2 The first  crucial  point  is  the  interpretation of  Husserl’s  thought.  Reading Husserl’s
thought in an idealist way does not permit to use his phenomenology for a completely
new conception of being as the one held by pragmatists.
3 Second,  it  is  not  clear  where  the  intersection  has  to  be  fixed.  Where  could
phenomenology and pragmatism find a  unifying concept or  moment? Even Peirce’s
classification of science that lists phenomenology and semiotics, indicating in the first
the origin of the principles of the second one, does not solve the problem precisely,
even though it suggests a possible strategy.
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4 Third, contrary to what happened at the beginning of the last century, phenomenology
and pragmatism should become clear about the new paradigms they foster. In their
original version they proclaimed the revolution but they never got there, or never got
far enough.
5 For these reasons, Costa’s book on intersubjectivity is a good starting point and very
useful to overcome at least the first obstacle, and producing some insightful comments
on the other two.
 
II. Milan School of Phenomenology and Costa’s
Reading of Intersubjectivity
6 There are at least as many ways to read Husserl as to read Peirce. Costa belongs to an
Italian phenomenological school, based in Milan, and founded by Antonio Banfi and
Enzo Paci at the half of the last century. Various phenomenological streams stemmed
from their lessons. One of the most important is the one led by Giovanni Piana in the
‘60s. Piana and his followers read Husserl in a realistic way, pointing out the difference
between  genetic  and  static  approach  to  phenomenology,  the  power  of  passive
syntheses as anti-subjectivist moment in the formation of the world, and the methodic
relevance of Husserl’s reductions (Costa, Franzini & Spinicci 2002).
7 Costa is a powerful representative of this school of thought. Besides that, he chooses a
topic as intersubjectivity, which amplifies this approach, and he has the gift of clarity.
8 According to Costa, Husserl never thought of founding intersubjectivity on a solipsistic
ground. The phenomenological analysis that reduces everything to the certainty of the
lived self is “not a dogma but a structure” (56). Moreover, it is a static structure that
has nothing to do with the dynamic genesis of the self, which is naturally social.
9 The  static  structure  of  the  self  accounts  for  the  difference  between  the
phenomenological  perception  of  our  “experience”  (Erlebnis) and  any  others’.  This
difference explains why we know we are not lying while we never can say the same
about others. From this difference we can understand that the order of time is essential
to read consciousness in a phenomenological way: my original Erlebnis belongs to a
specific current of consciousness, to an ordered series of experiences that I can observe
directly, while I can enter another’s consciousness only indirectly.
10 I think that phenomenology has to instruct or to simply to remind pragmatists of this
crucial difference between our perception of ourselves and of the world. In Peirce’s
phenomenology there is a phenomenological difference between firstness, secondness
and thirdness which should catch the same issue. And some sort of recognition of this
phenomenic  difference,  or  rather,  the concern for  it,  is  certainly  present  in  James’
psychology,  and  in  Dewey’s  and  Mead’s  logics.  However,  sometimes  scholars  have
downplayed this phenomenological background focusing on more attractive semiotic
and logic paths loosing the importance of this background.
11 Costa  explores  this  fundamental  theme  in  comparison  with  different  approaches:
Lacan’s psychoanalysis, Scheler’s, Schütz’s, Sartre’s phenomenology, cognitive sciences.
His argument is that every other approach has to presuppose the phenomenological
relationships that are founded in the experience of the self. Statically, then, the world
and its sociality are founded by the self, and not the other way around: “if I had no
experience of my action in my body, to be active in my body and to express myself in it,
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I could not apperceive a different body as expression of another living consciousness”
(89).
12 Here one may discover the critical point. Passing from the original experience of the
self  to  others’  consciousness,  Costa  relies  upon  Husserl’s  well  known  concept  of
analogy. He tries to read it as realistically as possible maintaining that the late Husserl
understood  analogy  as  a  “passive  intentionality,”  an  already-happened
phenomenological synthesis that implies a necessary cross-reference among contents
(90-1). Here analogy is not a form of reasoning but a form of intentionality. I will return
to this point later.
13 Once ascertained the passage from the self to the other, Costa becomes a pragmatist. He
denies almost any form of “empathy” in favor of an interactionist view of the world
(110) so that signs, tools, culture have to be explained reading and interpreting another
person and not magically entering his self-consciousness. Moreover, Costa uses Mead’s
concept  of  significant  gesture  to  account  for  the  birth  of  culture,  namely  for  the
interpretation  of  another  one  through  external  signs  (162).  Originally,  Costa  ties
comprehension to the important dimension of totality without which signs could only
partially work. Without reference to totality, they work only as they work in animals,
as  sense stimuli,  but  they cannot  have the teleological  reference to  everybody and
every time in the future, which are typical of human actions. “I’ll do that for x and y,”
implies somehow the whole history and that is why “promises” and similar acts are so
important in human relationships: they express this reference to totality. It is a kind of
remark  that  matches  Peirce’s  insistence  on  the  teleological  drive  present  in  signs
(Hulswit 2002; Short 2007).
14 Costa’s  reading  succeeds  in  giving  us  a  thorough  phenomenological  account  that
encompasses many, and some of the best, insights of contemporary philosophy. He can
combine  his  pattern  with  both  pragmatism  and  hermeneutic  narrative  patterns
rescuing from each scheme the part more akin to clarity and common sense.
 
III. The Point of Intersection
15 We saw the critical point is the intersection between phenomenology and semiotics.
The crucial point is “analogy,” the kind of phenomenological operation that presides
over our initial attribution of a mind to others. Correctly, Costa focuses on defending
analogy from biological innatism and categorical transcendentalism, but he maintains
that analogy is not a reasoning as well because it is an “ante-predicative association”
(that comes before any predication), “a unitary synthetic phenomenon” (91, 92). Here
the Husserlian belonging is winning out against the usual respect for common sense
that Costa shows in his book. Why is “association” not a possible part of a reasoning?
Why is “synthesis” not a reasoning, even if Costa himself reads it as a set of “internal
rules of  reference”? Peirce’s  semiotic explains association as indexical,  and internal
cross references as iconic driven. They are the first part or move of reasoning, both
statically  and  genetically  conceived.  The  intersection  between  phenomenology  and
semiotics does not come with Mead’s significant gesture, as Costa suggests, but with
Peirce’s classification of signs. Of course, it is a kind of intersection that conveys big
issues, and probably also the link between Peirce’s phenomenology and semiotics has
not been settled yet. However, this would be an interesting point to merge the two
philosophies.
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16 Pure Peirce scholars will object that in Peirce there is no room for any internalism and
that we should better get rid also of the foundation of the self on our phenomenological
knowledge. However, Costa does deny that we get to the self through an external, sign-
driven way,  as  far  as  we are  describing the dynamic  of  reasoning.  Only  in  a  static
dimension  he  stresses  the  foundation  of  the  self  on  a  continuity  of  time  directly
perceived,  a  dimension  that  classic  pragmatists  often  downplayed  favoring  an
inferential account. But this latter approach is not absolute and in any case it is worth
discussing because in there we can find some of the most interesting suggestions of
pragmatism about epistemology and metaphysics of the Self (see Calcaterra 2006) and
of  Continuity.  Interestingly,  the  consistent  understanding of  this  phenomenological
perception as referred to the continuity of time seems to connect Costa’s insight to the
more advanced theories on mathematical intuitionism that use Husserl and Peirce at
once  (see  Zalamea  2008).  According  to  this  approach  we  can  maintain  that
phenomenology and pragmatism refer to the same essential world of possibilities. The
real issue is to understand how these possibilities become actual and necessary, and
how the concept of continuity plays a decisive role in this understanding.
17 In order to complete this insight about the way in which the continuity of possibilities
involves  actualities  and  necessities,  we should  deepen  the  concept  of  syntheticity,
probably more than what Peirce and Husserl did. I think they remained caught in a too
much ‘like Kant’ view of synthesis, in its turn tied to a particular view of necessity.
18 Peirce’s semiotic can furnish the grammar for a different kind of syntheticity based on
a  very  different  conception  of  necessity  as  “habit  of  action.”  Peirce’s  view  of
mathematics  and our ways of  “doing mathematics”  through diagrams that  conveys
universals  into particulars  can be the phenomenological  and semiotic  path that  we
need in order to get to this profound comprehension of syntheticity. It would be also a
concrete and fertile field of intersection between phenomenology and semiotics, a field
that would exploit and develop the inspiring insight of Costa’s book.
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